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Abstract:  
Social media has reshaped business models, economies, politics, and culture around the 
world. In this paper, we identified social media stocks from various sectors by using a strict, 
academic definition and then studied their performance and return characteristics. 
Multivariate regression results demonstrate that being recognized as a social media firm 
yields extra return. The performance of social media stocks is not associated with macro-
level sentiment, but rather with firm-level attention paid by potential investors. Causality 
tests indicate that the default risk premium and volatility have incremental power in 
explaining the performance of social media stocks. 
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“It took 38 years for the radio to attract 50 million listeners, and 13 years for television to gain the attention of 50 
million viewers. The Internet took only four years to attract 50 million participants, and Facebook reached 50 million 
participants in only one-and-a-half years.”         
   (Nair 2011) 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
Social media firms have drawn much attention from investors and the financial press. The 
initial public offerings of Facebook and Twitter represent examples of this intense investor interest. 
Facebook set several market records by its IPO on May 18, 2012, including: (1) the largest venture-
backed IPO debuting at over $100 billion, (2) the largest venture capital raised with $2.2 billion in 
equity financing acquired prior to IPO, and (3) the most active pre-IPO acquirer (Facebook acquired 
13 venture-backed enterprises prior to its IPO).1 Facebook facilitates social networking around the 
globe and is ubiquitous with the term “social media.” In November 2013, the IPO of Twitter also 
drew a lot of attention as its stock rose from the IPO price of $26 to a first trading day closing price 
of $44.90. Additionally, social media firms have become increasingly significant to the economy. In 
May 2017, for instance, two out of the top ten multi-billion-dollar “unicorns” ranked by Fortune 
magazine were social media startups that may be publicly-traded in the future.2  
Given this intense investor interest, we conducted this study to learn about the performance 
and return characteristics of social media stocks. Specifically, does being recognized as a social media 
firm yield extra value when controlling for possible pricing anomalies? Are social media firms merely 
a subset of dot-coms in terms of the stock price behavior? Is the performance of social media stocks 
related to market-wide sentiment or investor attention at the firm level? What factor loadings drive 
social media firm value? We explored the impact of various market risks, forward market volatility, 
investor attention, and investor sentiment on the performance of social media stocks. Though social 
                                                 
1 See http://venturebeat.com/2012/05/16/record-breaking-facebook-ipo/. 















media has been widely recognized as a specialized economic sector, the stocks currently are 
categorized across several industries. To answer these questions, we manually collected data on all 
publicly-listed social media firms using the definition proposed by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010). 
Social media has changed and reshaped business models, economies, politics, and culture 
throughout the world. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that widespread use of social media 
technologies will transform communications from one-to-one interactions into many-to-many 
interactions, resulting in productivity gains of 20-25% amongst workers in knowledge-intensive 
professions. It was further estimated that this shift could result in a $900 billion to $1.3 trillion 
increase in economic surplus annually, if industries fully embrace the benefits offered by the 
adoption of social technologies throughout their business models.3 Clearly, the anticipated impact of 
social media as a new industry is more than a mere social matter. For instance, Cohen (2013) 
documented the impact of innovation on economic growth on long-term corporate performance 
and on security returns. Understanding the factors that are associated with the performance of social 
media stocks is useful to evaluating these assets for possible portfolio inclusion. 
The buzz surrounding the social media craze is reminiscent of that of the dot-com era from 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Ofek and Richardson (2003), Griffin et al. (2011), and Yu and Yuan 
(2011) analyzed how markets priced technology stocks through the previous wave of strong investor 
interest. Customer-to-customer feedback about experiences gave rise to the phrase “going viral.” By 
monitoring the social media posts of their customers, firms can respond to customers more quickly, 
accelerating both the pace of product response and obsolescence. 
The infrastructure used to support socialization provides opportunities for business, ranging 
from data analytics (e.g., Palantir and IBM-Watson), e-commerce (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba, and 
Flipkart), to the sharing economy (e.g., Uber and Airbnb). The business model of social media 
                                                 















service also leaves challenges for valuation. What drives corporate value? Is it the overall market 
sentiment or firm-level investor attention? Since the definition and scope of social media is not 
completely clear, even for financial regulators, a study on their stock performance remains uncharted 
territory. Given the fact that large, private social media companies, such as the aforementioned 
unicorns Snapchat and Pinterest, are becoming publicly-listed, a study of social media stock price 
behavior seems timely and relevant to both academia and Wall Street.  
In any era, investors can identify a group of investments that outperformed the market such 
as the concept stocks described by Hsieh and Walkling (2006). As an emerging technology sector, 
social media firms may be experiencing outperformance as predicted in the hype cycles. Gartner 
suggested that this is associated with a new business model advancing through various phases of 
development as entrepreneurial ventures.4 An ex ante expectation of this outperformance is rooted in 
investor-driven interest in the firms offering new technology formats. The “going viral” effect has 
quickly gained widespread adoption by users. Therefore, it is important to question whether social 
media stocks are influenced by behavioral factors that are beyond the risk factors documented by 
asset pricing models. 
To conduct our study, we thoroughly analyzed publicly-listed firms and identified the 
population of social media firms trading on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. The population includes 
obvious firms such as Facebook and LinkedIn. Missing from our population are several high-profile 
social media firms such as Snapchat, Linden Labs, and Wooga, which remain privately-held. For 
example, Pinterest, an online photo-sharing bulletin board, was valued at $2.5 billion in February 
2013, three years after its launch, following an injection of capital by Valiant. This is larger than the 
market value of some current public companies such as Zynga, Yelp, and Pandora.5  
                                                 
















We applied various models to evaluate the relation of behavioral measures, specifically those 
including attention and sentiment, with the performance of social media stocks, controlling for other 
known risk factors. We found that social media stocks outperformed the market by providing a 
positive abnormal return while controlling for various risk factors. Unlike the technology stocks of 
the previous dot-com era, social media stocks appear to be unaffected by market-level sentiment. 
Our results indicate that market sentiment does not appear to be priced in social media stocks. 
Rather, investors show firm-level interest in social media stocks, as captured by the abnormal 
Google search volume index (SVI), proposed by Da et al. (2011). 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review and 
theoretical development. In Section 3, we explain our data and methodology. Section 4 analyzes the 
performance of social media stocks and their relation to investor attention and investor sentiment. 
In Section 5, we study how various macroeconomic factors are associated with social media 
outperformance. Section 6 provides our conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Development 
Social media, as a new communication platform, has had a tremendous impact on the world 
economy. As more users enter into virtual gathering places, information delivery and 
communication have transitioned from traditional media (television, radio, and print media) to user-
generated social media platforms. The impact of social media on business is wide ranging, as noted 
by scholars in information systems (Luo et al. 2013), marketing (Kim & Ko 2012), law (Janoski-
Haehlen 2011; Bellin 2012), supply chain management (O'Leary 2011), and across the business 
disciplines (Trainor et al. 2014). 
Finance research on social media firms is also new. Social media stocks can be classified as 
concept stocks after 2000, according to the definition of Hsieh and Walkling (2006). Sornette and 















fundamental value-based model of social media firms. Larcker et al. (2014) investigate the role that 
social media can play in assisting boards of directors with monitoring customer experiences. 
Specifically, they consider the word-of-mouth offered freely by customers as an early warning 
system before poor customer experiences go viral and damage a firm’s reputation. Chen et al. (2014) 
conduct a textual analysis of social posts and investigate its relation to stock returns and earnings 
surprises. Karabulut (2013) and Heimer and Simon (2015) study a proprietary database of retail 
investors that share a common social platform. They find that communications over social media 
platforms by active, professional investors led to more active trading. Most of the current research 
has focused on how the information revealed by social media affected market behavior, but has not 
investigated the investment value of social media stocks. 
Some of the firms in our population have their origins in the dot-com era; thus, we 
considered similarities and differences between the findings of the dot-com era and our study of 
social media companies. The mania for dot-coms was followed by a crash. Ofek and Richardson 
(2003) attribute the selloff of stocks to lockup expirations. In contrast, Griffin et al. (2011) attribute 
the selloff to institutions exiting the sector in a coordinated fashion. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
study the relation between severe IPO underpricing (as recently seen with Twitter) and firm 
characteristics unique to the dot-coms. Overall, Hendershott (2004) finds that value was created in 
his sample of venture-backed dot-coms, with 19% annual return, even after controlling for the 
known price surge and correction of the dot-com era. 
DeMarzo et al. (2007) provide a theoretical model that explains how technological firms tend 
to overinvest, resulting in synchronized mispricing of technology stocks. The prediction of their 
model is for overinvestment to arise from an impulse for investors to herd into these stocks, 















new type of industry creates heightened investor interest in the markets and how asset price bubbles 
result.  
Like the preceding technology firms, social media firms may therefore be experiencing 
outperformance due to the hype associated with this new business model. It is natural to question 
whether the factors affecting social media stock returns are the risk factors from asset pricing 
models or more behaviorally focused factors.  Fama and French (1993) establish the three-factor 
model which includes risk factors for an asset’s covariablility with market returns, a size effect and a 
value effect. Their model extended the single-factor capital asset pricing model appreciating that 
smaller firms exhibit higher returns than larger firms do and that the firms with high book-to-market 
ratios exhibit higher returns than low book-to-market firms do. Recently, Fama and French (2015) 
expanded the Fama-French three-factor model to include two new factors that capture profitability 
(RMW) and investment (CMA).  
With respect to behaviorally focused factors, Baker and Wurgler (2006) demonstrate that 
sentiment plays a role in explaining the cross section of equity returns. Using principal components 
analysis (PCA), they built an index of six factors thought to capture the overall sentiment in the 
equity markets: the closed-end fund discount, NYSE turnover,6 the number and average first-day 
returns of initial public offerings (IPOs), equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) found that periods of low sentiment were followed by higher than normal 
returns for certain stocks: those that were small, young, highly-volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend 
paying, fast-growing, and distressed. Yu and Yuan (2011) then considered the mean-variance relation 
of sentiment, demonstrating that sentiment is unrelated to the mean-variance relation during the 
periods of high sentiment. Tsukioka, Yanagi, and Takada (2018) find excessive optimism leads to the 
high initial returns and long-run underperformance of IPO by using text data on message boards. 
                                                 
6 NYSE turnover was removed from the index in 2015, because NYSE turnover now captures more than investor 















Da et al. (2011) suggest using Google search volume index (SVI) of stock tickers as a 
measure of retail investor attention. Retail investors are thought to be susceptible to irrational, noise 
trading, and SVI is a direct revealed preference measure of investor attention. They found that 
changes in weekly search volume was a leading measure of investor attention which predicted future 
stock prices over the subsequent two week period. 
Social media offers a new business paradigm that may be attractive to investors interested in 
new investment opportunities. We therefore considered whether social media stocks have generated 
superior performance over our sample period. An ex ante expectation of this outperformance is 
rooted in demand driven interest by firms offering new technology formats which have quickly 
gained widespread adoption by users. Our first hypothesis is: 
(H1) Controlling for known risk factors, social media stocks exhibit outperformance. 
Finding outperformance would be consistent with interest in social media stocks early in 
their introduction. The attention pushes prices beyond the levels justified by fundamentals. It could 
also be consistent with heightened sentiment in the market as a whole. If sentiment was influential 
over the sample period, outperformance could be attenuated by the effect of sentiment. Our second 
hypothesis is therefore: 
(H2) Social media stock performance is influenced by sentiment. 
We expect sentiment to be significantly negative (outperformance associated with low 
sentiment) given that Baker and Wurgler (2006) found that sentiment exhibited stronger effects for 
firms with highly subjective valuations and stocks difficult to arbitrage. Given their newness, social 
media firms are likely more difficult to value and therefore to arbitrage.  
While sentiment offers a top-down view of how emotions can enter into investment 
selections, a more direct measure of firm-level scrutiny is captured by investor attention. Social 















technologies retailed by Gartner indicated distinct phases of the maturity of a technology industry as 
it relates to their visibility.7 Gartner proposed that the visibility of a new technology product or 
service rapidly rises as it is introduced. After visibility peaks, expectations for the industry are 
brought back to normal levels as visibility returns to more sustainable levels. Then, as the technology 
gains widespread adoption and the industry matures, a more normal growth pattern emerges. We 
consider investor attention as a proxy for heightened visibility. Our third hypothesis is: 
(H3) Social media stock performance is influenced by investor attention. 
Consistent with the findings of Da et al. (2011), we expect greater attention to be focused on 
social media stocks and for that attention to be a significant factor in explaining outperformance.  
 
3. Materials and Methods 
Identifying social media firms that satisfy both investor intuition and academic precision was 
the first challenge of our study. An interesting event illustrates this ambiguity even to regulators. In 
July 2012, Netflix CEO, Reed Hastings, posted material information about Netflix to his personal 
page on Facebook. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought charges of improper 
disclosure against Hastings in December 2012 for failing to make full disclosure through approved 
outlets. Following its investigation, the SEC ruled in April 2013 that news could flow into social 
media venues if investors are notified that announcements are routinely made through these venues. 
The SEC recognized the shift of information into social media spaces. However, it did not attempt 
to define social media outlets in its guidance. 
We first identified the population of social media firms. Facebook seemed to be an obvious 
social media firm, but whether to include others, such as Angie’s List or Groupon, was less clear. We 
applied the definition proposed by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) to set the population. They are 
webspaces: (1) operating in a Web 2.0 environment (that is, real-time and dynamically updateable to 
















make online communication feasible), (2) of user-generated content defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development(Vickery & Wunsch-Vincent 2007), and (3) demonstrating 
features of social presence, media richness, self-presentation, and self-disclosure. For the period 
January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2014, we identified 43 social media firms traded on the NYSE, 
Amex and Nasdaq. Global X Management Company LLC debuted a social media ETF on 
November 11, 2011. Its portfolio includes non-social media firms, such as Angie’s List, Groupon, 
and Nutrisystem. We selected this sample period to enable the tests of investor attention that rely on 
Google search volume index (SVI) available from January 1, 2004. See the appendix for further 
details on population identification. 
Table 1 contains the list of firms that form the social media population. A fair number of 
these social media firms are international enterprises that are traded in the U.S. markets as American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs). As such, it is appropriate to include them in the population and to use 
the U.S. market risk loadings to test their asset pricing behaviors. Furthermore, their membership as 
social media firms reflects the increasingly global nature of business.8 The population was further 
split into two main types of social media firms. The first type, most typically identified to be social 
media, is social networking, including Facebook and Twitter. The second type is social gaming in 
which a game is the forum for socializing. One might equate these to their face-to-face counterparts 
of a coffee klatch (social networking) and socializing over a game of dominos (social gaming). We 
also include the U.S. based online dating service providers in this study. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
We considered possible differences within the population between social gaming firms and 
social networking firms. Although both types fit the broad definition of social media, Kaplan & 
                                                 
8 We conducted robustness tests with and without international domiciled firms. Their presence or absence in the 
population did not change the results throughout this study. It is necessary to allow these international firms to remain in 















Haenlein (2010) differentiate between social networking and virtual gaming spaces along two 
dimensions. Social networking spaces are believed to have a higher degree of self-presentation than 
social gaming spaces. For example, posting in a Facebook news feed offers highly personalized 
information about the author (and possibly the friends who the author chooses to include in the 
post), whereas participating in multi-player online gaming has less flexibility for specific 
personalization. Your picture sends different information than does your avatar. Conversely, social 
gaming spaces offer a higher degree of media richness than social networking spaces. This is due to 
the intention of drawing the player into the game through a high degree of apparent realism of the 
gaming space. 
To compare social media firms to the industry in which they are members, we constructed 
industry benchmark returns and collected monthly returns for all firms in the same 4-digit SIC code 
of the identified social media firms. We used monthly returns from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), for the data to compute the market value of equity, and for industry 
membership codes (SIC). We then formed an industry return by averaging the monthly returns 
within each SIC grouping.9  
Table 2 reports summary statistics of monthly returns and firm size between 2004 and 2014 
for social media firms, their industry peers, and all U.S. stocks. Panel A shows that social media 
firms had slightly lower average raw returns than the industries they came from, but that they were 
higher than the broader U.S. stock market. Risk, as captured by the standard deviation of returns, 
was stronger for social media than either their industry peers or the broader U.S. stock market. Panel 
B shows that the size of social media firms is generally larger than both their industries and the 
average U.S. stock. If we find abnormal returns for social media firms, it is not merely a firm size 
effect. 
                                                 
















<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Figure 1 plots the cumulative returns of an equal-weighted social media index plotted against 
benchmark cumulative returns for the S&P 500 and Nasdaq from 2004 - 2014. Social media firms 
outperformed both these benchmarks in terms of raw return, but also exhibited greater 
fluctuations.10 This seems to be consistent with a general impression about the outperformance of 
social media stocks.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
We computed abnormal returns by controlling for risk factors. Using the monthly return 
measure, we apply (1) the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and (2) the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model to detect abnormal returns: 
	 −  =		 +  −  +  +  +	  ,                    (1) 
and 
	 −  =		 +  −  +  +  +	 +  +  ,  (2) 
where  is firm i’s return,  is the risk-free rate,  is the market benchmark return, SMB is the 
size premium, HML is the value/growth premium, RMW is the robust minus weak profitability 
factor, CMA is the conservative minus aggressive investment factor, and 	 is the abnormal return 
from the regression.  
 For our tests of investor attention, we gathered Google search volume index (SVI) arrays for 
the tickers that are part of our social media population and for the firms in the industries from 
which social media firms come. We followed Da et al. (2011) and collected the SVI, available from 
January 1, 2004, for tickers from Google Trends. If the frequency of searching was strong enough, 
data was available weekly. Less frequently searched tickers were available monthly, while some 
                                                 















tickers resulted in null searches. Because our tests were conducted using monthly returns, we 
converted SVI from weekly to monthly. We began by taking the natural logarithm of SVI plus one 
as ln(SVI) to keep firms without adequate search volume indexes from exiting the sample. Based on 
the methodology in Da et al. (2011), we used the prior two months of data as the benchmark of 
attention to generate abnormal SVI, ln(aSVI). Specifically, ln(aSVI) was constructed by taking the 
difference between current ln(SVI) and the mean of the previous two month’s ln(SVI). We used 
consumer sentiment from monthly surveys conducted by the University of Michigan.11  
For our mean-variance tests, we constructed Sharpe ratios to investigate the time-variation in 
the risk-return behavior of social media stocks. For each month, we formed Sharpe ratios by using 
the past 52 weekly returns. The yield for the 3-month Treasury bill was used as the proxy for the 
risk-free rate. We computed the expected return and standard deviation from the weekly returns of 
social media stocks and their corresponding industries. We then formed the average Sharpe ratio for 












 .        (3) 
Figure 2 demonstrates the time-series behavior of the Sharpe ratio and its long-term 
smoothing curve (H-P) proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). It shows no specific trend in the 
long term, but it is volatile over time. The time-variation of the mean-variance efficiency was 
particularly significant in the first half of the sample period. The pattern seems to follow the 
business cycle, which suggests that performance may be associated with macroeconomic factors.  
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
                                                 
11 When our empirical work was being conducted, the Baker and Wurgler (2006) factors were not available to match our 
sample period. Because Baker and Wurgler (2006) noted the high degree of correlation between their measure and the 
















4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Performance of social media index returns 
We formed both an equal-weighted and a value-weighted social media index by including all 
the social media stocks and examined their performance. Table 3 presents the regression analysis for 
the social media indexes. We control for risk factors by estimating the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Earlier enthusiasm for social 
media as a new business paradigm does not imply outperformance of social media stocks. Indeed, 
DeMarzo et al. (2007) predict that strong investor interest in technology firms can erode their 
performance through investors herding into the new investment opportunities. Hsieh and Walkling 
(2006) found overpricing of concept stocks after controlling for factors such as glamour, IPO, 
industry, or contrarian effects. Panel A presents the results for equal-weighted returns. For the 
period 2004 - 2014, the index showed a 12.7% abnormal annualized return for the three-factor 
model and a 16.3% abnormal annualized return for the five-factor model, both significant at the 1% 
level.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
We also present the results of social gaming and social networking. Consistent with the 
results from the broader population, the social gaming index outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis, 
showing a 13.3% abnormal annualized return for the three-factor model and 17.0% abnormal 
annualized return for the five-factor model, statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels. The 
coefficient on the investment aggressiveness factor (CMA) indicates that more aggressive 
investments had been made in social gaming than in either social media or social networking. 
Column 3 shows the results for social networking. There was marginal evidence of outperformance 















(significant at the 10% level) and a 15.6% abnormal return for the five-factor model (significant at 
the 5% level).  
In Panel B, we show the results for the value-weighted indices, which are economically and 
statistically insignificant. The adjusted R2 is lower for the value-weighted returns (48.8%) than for 
the equal-weighted returns (61.3%), based on the five-factor model. Baker and Wurgler (2006) note 
that theory indicates that large firms will be less effected by sentiment; therefore, they do not 
conduct their tests of sentiment using value-weighted returns. We follow their approach, and, as a 
result, the rest of the paper will use equal-weighted indices in further statistical tests.  
The evidence from Table 3 is consistent with our first hypothesis that social media firms 
outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis. The null hypothesis, that the widely applied asset pricing 
models efficiently price social media stocks, is rejected. In the next section, we will investigate the 
effects of sentiment on and attention to social media stocks. 
 
4.2. Investor sentiment and attention in social media firms 
We considered whether abnormal returns of the social media index were associated with the 
sentiment of the overall market or investor attention to individual stocks. Over any particular period, 
one may observe a subset of firms outperforming or underperforming on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Rather than merely knowing the outperformance of social media stocks over the sample period, we 
were interested in what type of behavioral factors most likely affected the social media performance. 
Since the triumph of social media depends on “going viral,” what kind of behavioral measures 
affected its returns? Is social media stock performance associated with a macro level of interest 
captured by market-wide sentiment (Baker & Wurgler 2006)? Alternatively, did a micro level measure, 
as captured by investor attention (Da et al. 2011), better reflect the interest? Given that social media 
firms have generated intense interest from the market, it is worthwhile to understand which factors 















In Table 4, we report firm-level regression results investigating how sentiment affected social 
media stock returns. We show results for both the Fama and French three-factor and five-factor 
models. For each column we considered social media stocks, non-social media stocks from the same 
4-digit SIC code, and the combination of the two groups.  
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 In the full sample shown as Column 1, we have conflicting evidence across the three-factor 
and five-factor models. The three-factor model shows insignificance of sentiment and a statistically 
insignificant intercept. The five-factor model shows a significantly positive abnormal return, coupled 
with a significantly negative coefficient on sentiment. The coefficients on RMW and CMA are 
significantly negative, having reduced explanatory power from the HML factor, which captures the 
value premium. The evidence in Column 3 for peer firms of social media firms echoes Column 1, 
with sentiment acting as a drag during the period 2004 – 2014. Column 2 shows the results for the 
social media firms. The coefficients on the intercept and sentiment are not statistically different from 
zero. Interestingly, the coefficients on profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) are more 
significantly negative, indicating that social media stocks were weaker in profit margins, presumably 
due to more aggressive investments captured by a negative CMA coefficient. Column 2 shows the 
five-factor model fits the best capturing 17.61% of the variation, higher than adjusted R2 for 
Columns 1 or 3. Sentiment did not appear to be a priced factor for social media stocks, which rejects 
our hypothesis that sentiment was influential for social media stocks (H2). 
 To ensure that we had the power to detect a relation between social media performance and 
sentiment, we considered the level of sentiment during our sample period. Yu and Yuan (2011) 
found that sentiment was time dependent. In periods of low sentiment, the mean-variance tradeoff 
holds, while during high sentiment, it is not apparent. For our sample period, the average University 















average sentiment was 78.7, reflecting lower than average sentiment for our sample period. Of the 
132 months in the sample window, only 39 of these months were characterized by high sentiment 
(above the 85.1 average). Therefore, we believe that we had the power to detect the relation with 
sentiment, had there been one for social media stocks, which strengthens our findings. 
Recent studies by Barber and Odean (2008) and Da et al. (2011) indicated that investor 
attention can affect asset pricing. Given the interest in social media over the past decade, how are 
these attention-grabbing stocks associated with investor interest? We followed Da et al. (2011) and 
used the search volume index (SVI) data published by Google Trends as a direct measure of investor 
attention. We collected the SVI arrays for social media firms and their peer companies that shared 
the same 4-digit SIC code and compared their behavior. For our population, univariate results 
showed that social media firms had an average SVI and average abnormal SVI of 2.853 and 0.021, 
respectively. Their industry peers had a lower average SVI, but a slightly higher average abnormal 
SVI of 2.605 and 0.029, respectively. Note that the abnormal SVI represents the change in investor 
attention. 
Table 5 replaces sentiment with investor attention as a possible explanatory variable for 
explaining the outperformance of the social media stocks and non-social media stocks from the 
same 4-digit SIC code. We also studied the results of the combination of the two groups. Unlike the 
results for sentiment, investor attention appears to be an important factor across all groups for both 
three-factor and five-factor results, significant at the 1% level for all tests. Social media stocks on 
average received greater investor attention, and the return impact was slightly more economically 
significant than it was for peer firms in the same sectors with a lower statistical significance. 
Consistent with the results from the previous table, the coefficients on profitability (RMW) and 
investment (CMA) factors were also significantly negative. The results suggest weaker profitability 















as captured by adjusted R2 is substantially higher for social media stocks (19.6%) than for their peer 
firms (12.5%).  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
In Table 6, we show the relative significance of the factors driving asset prices by putting 
both sentiment and investor attention together in the model. Sentiment represents a market-wide 
excitement, while investor attention is a firm-level factor. Including both factors offers evidence as 
to which is more important in the pricing of social media stocks. On the one hand, mispricing of 
social media stocks may arise, as it did in the dot-com era, because investors were rushing to 
purchase a new generation of concept stocks. On the other hand, investors may be responding to 
firm information as captured by investor attention, which is a micro level variable.  
Tables 6 presents the findings of both three-factor and five-factor models for social media 
stocks, stocks of peer firms from the same 4-digit SIC code, and for each group separately between 
2004 and 2014. For social media stocks, the model intercepts disappear. Sentiment, while statistically 
insignificant, has driven out the remaining unexplained variation. Attention has a significantly 
positive association with the performance of social media firms. The adjusted R2 in the model was 
slightly lower when sentiment was included (18.4%) than when it was not included in Table 5 
(19.6%). Column 3 in Table 6 shows both market-wide sentiment and firm-level attention effects for 
the pricing of the peer firms. Sentiment acts as a drag on pricing for peer firms, and the result shows 
it is offset by the impact of investment attention. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
We showed that the micro level measure of investor behavior, attention (ASVI), influenced 
social media stocks and their peers. This finding is consistent with the finance literature (Da et al. 















peer firm stocks. Specifically, unlike their peer stocks in the same industries, social media stocks 
were not associated with the general emotion of the market as captured by investor sentiment. We 
also found a major difference in the source of asset pricing in Tables 5 and 6. The finding that the 
investment coefficient (CMA) for social media is about four times higher than those of peer stocks 
suggests that social media stocks are more sensitive to investment than their peers, which is perhaps 
more reflective of their innovative nature as social media firms. 
 
5. What Macroeconomic Factors Drive Social Media Performance? 
Our previous analysis showed that social media stocks outperformed the market and that 
investor attention was a significant pricing factor, providing support for our third hypothesis (H3). 
We then extended our analysis of social media firms to analyze the macroeconomic factors that 
drove this performance. In this section, we examine the relation between risk-adjusted returns of 
social media stocks and macroeconomic factors. 
 
5.1. GARCH regression analysis 
 We initially considered risk premiums from Chen et al. (1986) and forward volatility captured 
by the VIX (the CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index) of Fleming et al. (1995). Prior research suggests 
that the maturity risk premium (MRP) can be important in determining the equity premium (Fama & 
Gibbons 1982; Campbell 1987; Rapach et al. 2005). We measured MRP as the difference in yield 
between the 20-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. Campbell et al. (2008) and 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) found the economic importance of default risk in asset pricing. We set the 
default risk premium (DRP) as the difference in the average interest rate between Moody’s Baa and 















We also considered the impact of sentiment on performance. Yu and Yuan (2011) showed 
the relation between investor sentiment and the mean-variance relation.12 They found variation in 
the risk-return relation when investors had different attitudes about prospects. There is a positive 
tradeoff between risk and return during periods of low investor sentiment. However, the mean-
variance relation appeared to weaken during periods of high investor sentiment. Due to the time-
rolling nature of the Sharpe ratio calculation, it is appropriate to include a one-lag error in the 
regression. The dependent variable is the Sharpe ratio () of social media stocks
13. To control the 
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where xj’s are the macroeconomic variables. In addition to equation (6), we considered single-
variable regressions.  
Table 7 reports the regression results. The GARCH regression results in Column 1 show 
statistically significant estimates for DRP and VIX. The findings are consistent with the risk-
adjusted returns for social media firms being associated with stress in credit markets, as modeled by 
the default risk premium. As credit markets required greater risk premiums for liquidity and default, 
the Sharpe ratio for social media stocks decreased. The negative estimate on the VIX suggests that 
investors of social media stocks in general were inversely sensitive to higher forward risk 
environments. This may be because social media stocks provided investors new opportunities for 
those who were sensitive to market volatility. The single-variable regressions showed similar results 
                                                 
12 Yu and Yuan (2011) use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment measure and check for robustness with the 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. Results were similar with both measures; therefore, we elected to 
use the index more readily available to us. 
13 We computed the monthly Sharpe ratio of social media stocks by converting the weekly data to match the frequency 















to the multiple-variable regression. Consistent with our prior findings, sentiment was not an 
important factor for social media asset pricing.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
5.2. Causality tests 
We further applied Granger (1969) model to test whether these variables were associated 
with the risk-adjusted returns of social media stocks. We first confirmed that the series was 
stationary by using augmented Dickey–Fuller (1979) and Phillips–Perron (1988) tests. Using both 
the Akaike (1974) and the Schwarz (1978) criteria, we set 12 lags as the optimum in the time-series 
to test whether these variables Granger-cause the Sharpe ratio (SR) of the social media stocks.  
In Table 8, the F-statistics show that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected for the Granger 
causality test only for sentiment and the maturity risk premium. The regression results from Table 7 
suggest a statistical correlation between the Sharpe ratio and two risks: default risk and VIX. 
Granger causality tests further support the possibility that the changes in these variables determine 
the performance of social media stocks. Interestingly, it appears that projected risk captured by the 
VIX lends Granger causality to the performance of social media stocks. The performance of social 
media stocks appears to be associated with forward-looking risk and investor attention. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
Our empirical results showed that the return behavior of social media stocks was different 
from that of the dot-coms in terms of the influence of the overall-economy sentiment. Yu and Yuan 
(2011) considered the mean-variance implications of sentiment, demonstrating that sentiment seems 
to be a significant factor only during periods of low sentiment, with the relation decoupling during 
high sentiment. They suggest that dot-com stock pricing was associated with investor confidence. 















volatility, appear to determine the performance of this new group of stocks. We further confirmed 
the statistical correlation of these risk factors by showing Granger causality tests, which supported 
the notion that many of these factors influenced the relation for social media firms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Social media has accelerated the pace at which people communicate, socialize, learn, and 
conduct business. A study of the performance and pricing factors of social media firms has become 
important to both academia and Wall Street. We studied the performance of social media stocks by 
following the definition proposed by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) to set the population of social 
media firms. 
We found that social media firms generated abnormal returns of about 13% to 16% annually 
over the sample period. All five factors in the Fama-French (2015) model contribute to expected 
return, as well as investor attention. We also investigated various groups of social media: social 
networking and social gaming. Outperformance of social media stocks was related to and Granger-
caused by default risk premiums and forward volatility, but not investor sentiment. Our findings 
suggest the pricing behavior of social media stocks differs from their dot-com peers.  
Social media stocks should not be simply viewed as a subset of dot-com stocks because their 
stock prices behave differently. The results regarding the impact of macroeconomic factors on the 
excess industry-adjusted performance of social media stocks are insightful to understating their 
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Table 1. Social media firms 
The table reports social media firms that form the population. We follow the definition of social media firms from Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010) to manually identify the 43 social media firms. Column A lists the name of the firm. Column B classifies the firm as either social 
networking (N) or social gaming (G). Column C describes the rationale for membership as a social media firm. Columns D and E show the 
beginning and ending dates for membership as social media firms, listed by year and then month.  
  
 
(A) Company Name (B) Social (C) Description (D) Begin 
(E) 
End 
A O L INC N media platform, social networking (bebo and about.me)  200912 201412 
ANCESTRY COM INC N genealogy community 200911 201212 
BAIDU COM INC N news service, content, and social chat 200508 201412 
FACEBOOK INC N social networking 201205 201412 
GEEKNET INC N technology social networking and news 200401 201412 
GOOGLE INC N social networking (Orkut, Google Blog, Picasa, Google+) 200408 201412 
IAC INTERACTIVECORP N search applications, online dating, vimeo, ask.com 200401 201412 
JIAYUAN COM INTL LTD N Chinese online dating social network space 201105 201412 
LINKEDIN CORP N professional social networking 201105 201412 
REDIFF COM INDIA LTD N Indian news; social networking (Rediff MyPage)  200401 201412 
RENREN INC N Chinese social networking service 201105 201412 
SINA CORP N Chinese social networking (personal and professional) 200401 201412 
SOHU COM INC N Chinese content community and social networking 200401 201412 
TWITTER N real-time conversation - social expression 201311 201412 
UNITED ONLINE LTD N social networking and Internet provider 200401 201412 
WEIBO CORPORATION N social media in support of Chinese language acquisition 201404 201412 
YAHOO INC N news and social chat (Flickr, Tumblr, Yahoo 360)  200401 201412 
YANDEX N V N Russian social network and search engine 201105 201412 
YELP INC N business reviews and online yelper social space 201203 201412 
YOUKU COM INC N Chinese video content library; Internet television & video 201012 201412 















ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC G social gaming 200401 201412 
ANSWERS CORP G user generated answers + reference materials 200410 201104 
CHANGYOU COM LTD G Chinese social gaming 200904 201412 
CHINA MOBILE GAMES  G Chinese social gaming 201209 201412 
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC G social gaming and software services 200401 201412 
GIANT INTERACTIVE GROUP G Chinese social gaming 200711 201407 
GIGAMEDIA LIMITED G Taiwanese social gaming and cloud computing 200401 201412 
GLU MOBILE INC. G social gaming 200703 201412 
GRAVITY CO. LTD G social gaming 200502 201412 
KING DIGITIAL ENTERTAINMENT G social gaming 201403 201412 
KONGZHONG CORP. G Chinese social gaming 200407 201412 
MAJESCO ENTERTAINMENT CO G social gaming 200501 201412 
NETEASE COM INC G Chinese social gaming 200401 201412 
PERFECT WORLD CO LTD G Chinese social gaming 200707 201412 
PHEONIX NEW MEDIA LTD G Chinese social gaming 201105 201412 
SHANDA GAMES LTD G Chinese social gaming 200909 201412 
TAKE TWO INTERACTIVE  G social gaming and video gaming 200401 201412 
TAOMEE HOLDINGS LTD G Chinese social gaming 201106 201412 
THE9 LIMITED G Chinese social gaming 200412 201412 
WEBZEN INC G South Korean social gaming 200401 201007 
XUNLEI LTD G Chinese social gaming and cloud services 201406 201412 

















Table 2. Summary statistics  
The table reports the number of firm-month observations, minimum, median, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the monthly 
returns and market value of equity of social media stocks, industries in which social media firms are members (peer firms), and the universe 
of U.S. stocks from CRSP (excluding penny stocks). Panel A includes the monthly returns. Panel B contains the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity (in millions). The time period for the population is January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2014. We follow the definition 




Firm type N Min Median Max Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Panel A: Monthly returns 
Social Media 2,127 -0.4802 0.0113 1.1907 0.0212 0.1376 
Peer Firms 37,726 -0.8562 0.0121 3.8594 0.0219 0.1288 
US Stocks 611,024 -0.8686 0.0096 13.4951 0.0136 0.1037 
 
Panel B: Natural logarithm of market value of equity (except N) 
Social Media 2,127 16.7140 21.6712 26.5482 21.8234 1.8816 
Peer Firms 37,726 13.9043 20.5247 26.6930 20.4704 1.9680 
US Stocks 611,024 11.1211 20.3179 27.2640 20.2997 2.0117 















Table 3. Regression results for social media indexes 
This table contains regression results for indices of social media firms for the period January 1, 2004 - December 31, 2014. The indices are 
formed by equal weighting (Panel A) or by value weighting (Panel B) monthly raw returns to form three indices: social media (43 firms) and 
its two subgroups of social gaming (22 firms) and social networking (21 firms). The index returns are regressed on risk factors (excess 
market return (Mkt - Rf), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW) and investment patterns (CMA)) for the Fama-French three-factor 
(1993) and five-factor (2015) models. The coefficients shown reflect the coefficient on the intercept and their associated t statistics. 
Monthly returns are calculated by subtracting the adjusted stock price from CRSP from the previous month’s adjusted stock price and by 
dividing by the previous month’s adjusted stock price. Panel A shows results for equal-weighted index returns for social media (Column 1), 
social gaming (Column 2), and social networking (Column 3) indices. Panel B shows results for value-weighted index returns for social 
media (Column 4), social gaming (Column 5), and social networking (Column 6) indices. The risk factors are obtained from Ken French’s 
website. Tests of significance at traditional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, and *. 
 Dependent Variable - Monthly Returns 
 Panel A: Equal weighted 
 Column 1: Social Media Column 2: Social Gaming Column 3: Social Networking 
Variables Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  
Intercept 0.0106*** 0.0136***  0.0111** 0.0142***  0.0100* 0.0130**  
 (2.42) (3.04)  (2.07) (2.61)  (1.86) (2.32)  
Mkt - Rf 1.3257*** 1.1827***  1.2983*** 1.1414***  1.3602*** 1.2301***  
 (11.07) (9.26)  (8.85) (7.33)  (9.28) (7.69)  
SMB 0.5694*** 0.4540**  0.3803 0.2801  0.6839*** 0.5515**  
 (2.67) (2.10)  (1.45) (1.06)  (2.62) (2.04)  
HML -0.8038*** -0.6242***  -0.4770** -0.1648  -1.0965*** -1.0310***  
 (-4.08) (-2.93)  (-1.98) (-0.63)  (-4.55) (-3.86)  
RMW  -0.7181**   -0.6958*   -0.7436*  
  (2.16)   (-1.71)   (-1.78)  
CMA  -0.8616***   -1.3150***   -0.4473  
  (-2.41)   (-3.02)   (-1.00)  
          















 Panel B: Value weighted 
    
 Column 4: Social Media Column 5: Social Gaming Column 6: Social Networking 
          
Variables Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  
Intercept -0.0007** -0.0006*  -0.0005 -0.0002  -0.0004 -0.0002  
 (-2.04) (-1.72)  (-0.52) (-0.25)  (-0.56) (-0.23)  
Mkt - Rf 0.0940*** 0.0892***  0.1858*** 0.1728***  0.1712*** 0.1586***  
 (9.69) (8.38)  (7.15) (6.06)  (8.25) (6.99)  
SMB 0.0130 0.0106  0.0228 0.0161  0.0210 0.0132  
 (0.75) (0.59)  (0.49) (0.33)  (0.57) (0.34)  
HML -0.0774*** -0.0668***  -0.1016*** -0.0762  -0.1485*** -0.1228***  
 (-4.84) (-3.76)  (-2.38) (-1.60)  (-4.35) (-3.24)  
RMW  -0.0197   -0.0568   -0.0559  
  (-0.71)   (-0.76)   (-0.95)  
CMA  -0.0452   -0.1040   -0.1038  
  (-1.52)   (-1.30)   (-1.64)  
          
















Table 4. Stock pricing and sentiment 
The table reports regression results of sentiment in asset pricing for the period January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2014, for the Fama- French 
three-factor (1993) and five-factor (2015) models, and shows results for social media stocks and stocks from the same 4-digit SIC code 
combined (Column 1) and for each group separately (Columns 2 and 3). Returns are regressed on risk factors (excess market return (Mkt - 
Rf), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), and investment patterns (CMA)) for the Fama-French three-factor (1993) and five-
factor (2015) models. The coefficients shown reflect the coefficient on the intercept and their associated t statistics. We use monthly stock 
return data for 43 social media stocks and 1,299 non-social media stocks that share the 4-digit SIC code. The risk factors are obtained from 
Ken French’s website. Tests of significance at traditional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, and *. 
 
 Dependent Variable - Monthly Returns 
 Column 1: All Column 2: Social Media Column 3: Peer Firms 
Variables Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  
Intercept 0.00036 0.0886***  -0.05049 0.09659  0.00512 0.08877***  
 (0.01) (3.73)  (-0.55) (1.01)  (0.22) (3.62)  
Mkt - Rf 0.9916*** 0.9229***  1.3759*** 1.2645***  0.9664*** 0.8994***  
 (47.19) (42.40)  (15.72) (13.71)  (44.65) (40.15)  
SMB 0.7520*** 0.5757***  0.5746*** 0.4054***  0.7642*** 0.5892***  
 (23.28) (16.59)  (4.13) (2.79)  (23.02) (16.49)  
HML -0.4467*** -0.3780***  -0.8058*** -0.4837***  -0.4247*** -0.3754***  
 (-13.26) (-9.64)  (-5.82) (-3.07)  (-12.23) (-9.27)  
RMW  -0.6577***   -0.7674***   -0.6487***  
  (-12.67)   (-3.35)   (-12.17)  
CMA  -0.3672***   -1.1738***   -0.3115**  
  (-6.11)   (-4.73)   (-5.03)  
ln(Sentiment) 0.0058 -0.04006***  0.03118 -0.04534  0.00340 -0.04004***  
 (0.48) (-3.19)  (0.64) (-0.90)  (0.27) (-3.09)  
          
















Table 5. Stock pricing and attention  
The table reports regression results of investor attention in asset pricing for the period January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2014, for the Fama-
French three-factor (1993) and five-factor (2015) models, and shows results for social media stocks and stocks of peer firms from the same 
4-digit SIC code combined (Column 1) and for each group separately (Columns 2 and 3). Returns are regressed on risk factors (excess 
market return (Mkt - Rf), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), and investment patterns (CMA)) for the Fama-French three-factor 
(1993) and five-factor (2015) models. The coefficients shown reflect the coefficient on the intercept and their associated t statistics. We use 
monthly stock return data for 43 social media stocks and 1,299 non-social media stocks that share the 4-digit SIC code. Abnormal Search 
Volume Index (ln (ASVI)) is defined by Da et al. (2011) to directly measure the change in investor attention. The risk factors are obtained 
from Ken French’s website. Tests of significance at traditional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, and *. 
 Dependent Variable - Monthly Returns 
 Column 1: All Collumn  2: ocial Media Column 3: Peer Firms 
Variables Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  
Intercept 0.0110*** 0.0127***  0.0101*** 0.0130***  0.0111*** 0.0128***  
 (16.71) (19.01)  (3.62) (4.49)  (16.44) (18.57)  
Mkt - Rf 0.9911*** 0.9215***  1.3573*** 1.2242***  0.9665*** 0.9000***  
 (51.28) (45.96)  (17.26) (14.49)  (48.47) (43.59)  
SMB 0.6767*** 0.5304***  0.5353*** 0.4145***  0.6868*** 0.5407***  
 (21.46) (15.74)  (3.93) (2.93)  (21.20) (15.59)  
HML -0.4486*** -0.4026***  -0.8324*** -0.5667***  -0.4247*** -0.3964***  
 (-13.87) (-10.62)  (-6.26) (-3.74)  (-12.74) (-10.12)  
RMW  -0.5779***   -0.6570***   -0.5705***  
  (-11.84)   (-3.06)   (-11.39)  
CMA  -0.3214***   -1.0206***   -0.2712***  
  (-5.42)   (-4.18)   (-4.43)  
ln(ASVI) 0.0115*** 0.0113***  0.0142*** 0.0140***  0.0113*** 0.0111***  
 (11.41) (11.31)  (3.22) (3.18)  (10.93) (10.84)  
          

















Table 6. Stock pricing, sentiment, and attention 
The table reports regression results of sentiment and attention in asset pricing for the period January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2014, for the 
Fama-French three-factor (1993) and five-factor (2015) models, and shows results for social media stocks and stocks of peer firms from 
the same 4-digit SIC code combined (Column 1) and for each group separately (Columns 2 and 3). Returns are regressed on risk factors 
(excess market return (Mkt - Rf), size (SMB), value (HML), profitability (RMW), and investment patterns (CMA)) for the Fama-French 
three-factor (1993) and five-factor (2015) models. The coefficients shown reflect the coefficient on the intercept and their associated t 
statistics. We use monthly stock return data for 43 social media stocks and 1,299 non-social media stocks that share the 4-digit SIC code. 
Abnormal Search Volume Index (ln (ASVI)) is defined by Da et al. (2011) to directly measure the change in investor attention. The risk 
factors are obtained from Ken French’s website. Tests of significance at traditional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, 
and *. 
 Dependent Variable - Monthly Returns 
 Column 1: All Column 2: Social Media Column 3: Peer Firms 
Variables Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  Three-factor Five-factor  
Intercept -0.00385 0.08686***  -0.07217 0.08423  0.00230 0.08766***  
 (-0.16) (3.54)  (-0.76) (0.85)  (0.09) (3.46)  
Mkt - Rf 1.00502*** 0.9329***  1.3858*** 1.2763***  0.9800*** 0.9092***  
 (47.14) (41.82)  (15.59) (13.45)  (44.63) (39.61)  
SMB 0.7222*** 0.5722***  0.5383*** 0.4053***  0.7348*** 0.5853***  
 (21.84) (16.36)  (3.78) (2.76)  (21.61) (16.26)  
HML -0.4831*** -0.3913***  -0.8277*** -0.4646***  -0.4615*** -0.3909***  
 (-14.00) (-9.67)  (-5.84) (-2.87)  (-12.97) (-9.35)  
RMW  -0.6154***   -0.6673***   -0.6103***  
  (-11.52)   (-2.82)   (-11.14)  
CMA  -0.3843***   -1.2457***   -0.3243***  
  (-6.19)   (-4.87)   (-5.07)  
ln(Sentiment) 0.00798 -0.03924***  0.04305 -0.03877  0.00484 -0.0396***  
 (0.64) (-3.03)  (0.86) (-0.74)  (0.38) (-2.96)  
ln(ASVI) 0.0112*** 0.01107***  0.01442*** 0.01460***  0.01096*** 0.01083***  
 (10.73) (10.64)  (3.21) (3.27)  (10.23) (10.13)  






























Table 7. GARCH regression of macroeconomic factors on Sharpe ratios of social media stocks 
The table reports the GARCH regression results of the variables affecting the Sharpe ratio of social 
media stocks (SR) using monthly data for January 1, 2004 - December 31, 2014. The regression 
models are , and the variance equation is , 
where xj’s are the macroeconomic variables. The maturity risk premium (MRP) is the difference in 
yield between the 20-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill; the default risk premium 
(DRP) is the difference in the average interest rate between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bonds; 
and VIX is the CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index. Sentiment is taken as the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index. Panel A shows the results of the regressions. The variance equations are 
reported in Panel B. Tests of significance at traditional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with 
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Panel A: GARCH Regression       
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
      Constant 0.030 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.042*** 0.039
 
(0.34) (2.34) (2.54) (3.07) (0.99) 
MRP 0.884* 0.720 
   
 
(1.73) (1.15) 
















 Sentiment -0.001 




   
(-0.15) 
      
Durbin-Watson  0.304 0.306 0.307 0.304 0.306 
            
Panel B: Variance Equation       
      ω 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(2.24) (2.46) (2.53) (2.48) (2.50) 
α 0.853*** 0.723** 0.710* 0.736* 0.716** 
 
(3.42) (2.02) (1.93) (1.95) (1.99) 
δ -0.230 0.039 0.073 0.011 0.054 
 















Table 8. Granger causality tests 
The table reports the results of pairwise Granger (1969) causality tests. The null hypotheses are the 
variables (MRP, DRP, ln(VIX), ln(aSVI), and ln(Sentiment)) do not Granger cause the Sharpe ratio of 
social media stocks (SRSM). We first check that the series are stationary by using augmented Dickey–
Fuller (1979) and Phillips–Perron (1988) tests and find that all series are stationary. Using both the 
Akaike (1974) and the Schwarz (1978) criteria, we set 12 lags as the optimum in the time-series to 
test whether these variables Granger-cause SR. The F-statistics and probabilities are shown.  
 
 
F value Prob. 
MRP does not Granger cause SRSM 0.895 0.555 
DRP does not Granger cause SRSM 2.028 0.030 
VIX does not Granger cause SRSM 2.346 0.011 
ln(aSVI) does not Granger cause SRSM 2.248 0.021 



















Figure 1. Social media index vs. S&P 500 and Nasdaq 
The social media index plotted against the returns on the S&P500 and the Nasdaq Index. Returns 
were computed monthly for the period January 1, 2004 - December 31, 2014. The social media 








































































Figure 2. Sharpe ratio of social media stocks 
The mean of Sharpe ratios of social media stocks between the period January 1, 2004 - December 
31, 2014, and its smoothing curve are presented. The Sharpe ratio is computed by using the 52 
weekly returns. The long-term trend is illustrated and smoothed by the filter proposed by Hodrick 
























Appendix: Population Identification 
The social media firms do not emanate from a common SIC or NAICS industry code. Thus, 
setting the population was a laborious process of searching firms and testing stocks against an 
objective, academic definition. In this study, we applied the definition proposed by Kaplan and 
Haenlein (2010) to a subpopulation of firms that we deemed unequivocally to be members of the 
social media industry, such as Facebook, Google, and Yelp. The common Yahoo! industry category 
for these firms was Internet Information Providers. Each of the 217 firms from the Yahoo! list for 
this industry, downloaded on May 2015, was considered as a potential member of social media 
(whether or not the firm was public). In addition, Global X Funds retails a social media ETF 
(SOCL) with 29 firms as of December 31, 2014. From these initial lists of candidate firms, we 
eliminated firms that did not meet the social media definition. Given the requirements of a web-
based platform, we also searched the 1,000 most active websites by web traffic from the Alexa List 
of Top Million websites based on one-month average traffic, downloaded on May 14, 2015. 
We then searched for additional candidate firms by identifying the competitors of our initial 
list of social media firms and testing these firms against the objective social media definition using 
Mergent Online, Lexis Nexis, and Value Line. These databases provided a list of competitors, which 
we added to our list as potential firms of the population. We compiled a list of industry codes and 
searched all CRSP-listed firms within these 18 sectors defined by 4-digit SIC codes traded on the 
NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. We considered each firm that appeared in these SIC codes as a 
candidate for the social media population.  
We manually investigated whether and when the firm had a user interface that fit the three 
criteria defined by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010). These sites could also have a more enhanced, fee-
based model (like LinkedIn), but they needed to host a platform beyond merely a comment portal in 















generated comment interface, but the portal exists to complement Amazon’s business model of 
retailing products. Thus, Amazon.com was not deemed to be a social media firm. On the other 
hand, Google has a very active search interface that is widely used. It also offers a social media 
interface known as Google+. The presence of the Google+ social space merits Google’s inclusion in 
the social media population. Many firms fit the definition of a social media firm, but remained either 
privately-held, traded on an exchange outside the United States, or traded as penny stocks. We list 


















Table A1 Social media firms not in the population 
We present social media companies that were not included in the current study. We report their type 
(privately-held, publicly-traded, or penny stocks), country of firm headquarters, exchange that shares 
are traded on, and category (social networking or social gaming).  
 
Firm Name Type Country Exchange Category 
Arkadium private United States N/A SG 
Linden Labs private United States N/A SG 
Peak Games private Turkey N/A SG 
Pinterest private United States N/A SN 
Pretty Simple private France N/A SG 
Socialpoint private Spain N/A SG 
Supercell private Finland N/A SG 
Wooga private Germany N/A SG 
Com2uS Corp  public Korea KRX SG 
Cupid public London LSE SN 
CyberAgent, Inc.  public Japan TYO SN 
Daum Kakao Corp.  public South Korea KRX SG 
Dena Co. Ltd. public United States OTC SG 
Forgame Holdings Ltd  public Hong Kong  SEKH SG 
Gameloft SE  public France EPA SG 
Gree public Japan Shenzen SN 
Mail.Ru Group Limited  public United Kingdom LSE SN 
Snapchat public United States OTC SN 
Tencent Holdings Limited  public Hong Kong SEKH SG 
Xing AG public Germany FWB SN 
Mixi Inc  public Japan TYO SN 
MeetMe, Inc. penny United States Nasdaq SN 
Spark Networks penny United States NYSE SN 
 
